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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze strategic policy implications arising from 
possible threats and opportunities in the face of the emergence of China as an 
economic powerhouse. The focus of the paper is not on the regional approach 
through mainly regional co-operations but more on policy strategies and 
responses at the national level. Depending on their degree of national economic 
development, economic structure and comparative advantage, eight strategic 
positionings have been identified. Of these eight positionings, direct competition 
is considered as an unwise move, considering China being endowed with 
relatively cheap labour resources. Together with its huge domestic market which 
can serve as a magnet for direct foreign investment, competition in attracting FDI 
can be a daunting task for most to the Southeast Asian countries. Instead, 
competition based on niche areas through branding, for instance provides a 
feasible alternative. The other alternative is to avoid direct competition by 
upgrading its economy, venturing into those areas where China has no 
comparative advantage as well as looking inward for sources of growth. Others 
may adopt ‘connecting’ strategies such as complementing or supplementing the 
Chinese economy by meeting China’s increasing demand for natural resources 
or exploiting its huge domestic market. Still others may explore the possibilities of 
forging strategic alliance with China in the global market or playing the role of a 
middleman between China the West.  
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Introduction 
When China adopted an open door policy in 1978, there was not much of a 
concern to the Asian countries, as political uncertainties within China still were 
unsettled1. After Deng’s visit to the Southern China in 1992, political atmosphere 
in favour of drastic economic reform emerged in earnest. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) started to pour in and reached a peak in 2005. Initial focus in 
manufacturing activities was directed at light manufacturing such as textiles, 
clothing, apparels, spot goods and toys. As multinational corporations (MNCs) 
from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Japan began to reallocate their electronics 
plants to China, China switched its focus to manufacturing of electrical, 
electronics and telecommunication products and was subsequently integrated 
into the Asian production networks. 2  The rapid expansion of manufacturing 
exports from China has raised the concern among Southeast Asian countries 
that their exports might be crowded out by Chinese exports in the third country 
markets, in particular the US market. This is because Chinese main comparative 
advantage in relatively cheap labour may wipe out Southeast Asian labour-
intensive industries. The concern is further aggravated by the accentuation of 
China serving as a magnet for attracting massive of FDI at the expense of 
Southeast Asia as a region. With the accession of China into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, such fear of ‘China threat’ has caused much 
anxiety within the region and various policy proposals were adopted in response 
to the emergence of China as an economic powerhouse. 
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China, on its part also attempts to allay the fear by showing its willingness to join 
the ASEAN’s free trade zone as early as in December 2000 with the objective of 
establishing the ASEAN-China free trade zone by year 2010. China also 
participated in other regional co-operation efforts such as the ‘Early Harvest 
Programme’ in October 2003 and Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) for financial 
cooperation in 2000. All these economic co-operations were well documented 
and updated by a recent book edited by Saw (2007). While regional approach 
towards the rise of China is well documented in the literature, individual national 
policy responses are not much recorded, however. The purpose of this paper is 
to assess various policy implications and also evaluate some of the policy 
responses adopted by the Southeast Asian countries. 
 
The paper is divided into four sections. After this Introduction, the paper, in its 
second section, attempts to ascertain the seriousness of China threat in trade 
and investment. The third section intends to assess various policy implications 
for the Southeast Asian countries from a national strategic perspective. The final 
section gives an overview of these policy implications and raises some of the 
issues and concerns for future discussion and research. 
 
Does China Pose a Threat?3
With the opening of China, its merchandise trade has increased tremendously 
over the last three decades. In particular, Chinese exports which totaled 1% of 
the total world exports in 1978, had increased significantly to 13% in 2005. 
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Consequently, China is the third largest trading nation after the United States and 
Germany in 2006. China’s trade structure has in the meantime, undergone a 
profound transformation since its opening in late 1970s. Firstly, manufactures 
exports as a percentage share of total merchandise exports rose from less than 
40% in late 1970s to 92.4% in 2006, with the rest accounted by agricultural and 
mineral products. Secondly, there was also a structural change within the 
manufacturing export sector. In the first and half decade after its opening, 
manufacturing exports comprised mainly labour intensive products such as 
apparel, footwear, toys and sport goods. These manufactures goods accounted 
for a half of the total merchandise exports and two-thirds of manufacturing 
exports by mid-1990s (Athukorala, 2007: 5). However, the composition of export 
trade shifted towards more sophisticated manufactures, such as electronics and 
telecommunications products as well as transport equipments and machinery. 
While sophisticated manufacturing exports recorded a dramatic increase from 
17% to 44% between 1993 and 2005, light manufacturing exports, however, 
showed a secular decline from 49% in 1993 to 31% in 2005. Notwithstanding 
with such dramatic shift, the degree of sophistication in these Chinese 
manufacturing exports is debatable, however. 
 
Does China Increase Its Market Share at the Expense of Southeast Asia? 
In mid-1990s, Southeast Asian countries’ market share in US and Japan’s 
imports already showed signs of retreating, in the face of increasing China’s 
competition. For instance, China’s share of US imports has increased from 0.7% 
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in 1987 to 9.2% in 2004 while the share of ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in the same market increased from 4.5% in 
1987 to 6.7% in 2000 and then declined to 3.8% in 2004. As Revenhill (2006) 
observes, China’s exports of office machinery, electrical machinery and 
telecommunications products which were insignificant in 1995 in US and 
Japanese markets started to exceed that of ASEAN-5 by around 2002. For 
clothing, apparel and footwear, the negative impact from China in these two 
markets was even more damaging. For instance, imports of clothing from China 
by Japan rose by more than 70% between 1995 and 2004 and, the share of this 
market reached 80%. In contrast, ASEAN’s share dwindled to 3% from 6.5% in 
the same period. This “trade competition” paradigm is well supported by 
empirical evidence provided by Bhattacharya A. S. Ghosh and W. J. Jansen 
(2001). Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong (2004) also concur that China’s exports to 
third markets tend to crowd out the exports of other Asian countries. Study by 
McKibbin and Woo (2003) also show pessimistic results that Southeast Asian 
industrial exports were facing intense competition from Chinese industrial exports. 
 
In the same vein, study by Lall and Albaladejo (2004) also shows the extent of 
competition from China. The authors use correlation analysis between Chinese 
and regional export structures as indicator of China’s competitive threat (see 
Table 1).  Between the period 1990 and 2000, they conclude that Chinese export 
structure was becoming similar to that of its neighbours. For instance, export 
structure of Singapore was hardly similar to that of China in 1990. However, by 
 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2008-26 5
year 2000, the correlation coefficient went up from 0.1 to 0.41. Other Southeast 
Asian countries also show similar trends. Chia and Sussangkarn (2006:109) 
calculate Spearman’s rank correlations on global exports of ASEAN and China 
for 2003 which shows R2= 0.6149 for the region. Individual countries show 
correlation between 0.4733 (Singapore) and 0.6663 (Thailand). 
 
Lall and Albaladejo (2004) also compute technological structure of China and 
ASEAN-5 (Table 2). All countries show an upgrading in their exports’ 
technological structure. China started with high share of resource-based and low 
technology exports. Within one decade, China had improved significantly on 
exports of high technology products. ASEAN-5 also displayed similar trends of 
varying degrees. The authors also use changes in world market shares as 
indicators of China’s threat. ASEAN-5 is considered as facing ‘direct threat’ from 
China if its market shares declines while that of China rises. Similarly, if both 
entities gain their market shares and that situation is considered as ‘no threat’ 
from China. However, if both entities gain market shares at the same time but 
China’s gain is faster, then it is noted as ‘partial threat.’ From Table 3, all 
ASEAN-5 face increasingly ‘partial threat’ from China but ‘direct threat’ has gone 
down significantly. Except for Malaysia, ‘direct threat’ for other ASEAN countries 
show significant declines. The number for ‘no threat’ from China also increased 
for all ASEAN-5 except Malaysia. There are two main reasons for such scenario. 
One is that ASEAN-5 exports a significant amount of machinery and electronic 
parts and components to China which later serves as an export platform for 
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these products after their processing or assembly there. That explains the 
increasing ‘partial threat’ from China and this is misleading. Secondly, ‘no threat’ 
from China increases because China imports large quantities of primary products 
and resource-based manufactures as well as capital and intermediate goods to 
meet its needs in domestic-oriented production. She also imports sophisticated 
consumer goods to meet increasing domestic dmand (Lall and Albaladejo, 2004: 
1457). Study by Ahearne and others (2003) also observe that there was a co-
movement of export growth between China and other Asian economies in the 
period between 1979 and 2001. Common factors such as economic growth in 
advanced economies, movements in the world prices of key exports and 
movements in the yen-dollar exchange rates exerted far more impact on all Asian 
exports. The implications from their analysis are that competition from China has 
negligible effects on Southeast Asian export performance. 
 
Revenhill (2006) also observes that shares of manufactures in China’s imports 
from ASEAN increased from a weighted average of 31% in 1990 to 56% in 2004 
(see Table 4). This confirms the view that China is deeply involved in the 
triangular trade of the Asian production networks (Gaulier, Lemone and Unal-
Kesend, 2005; Haddad and Easpr, March 2007; Athukorala, Prema-Chandra. 
2006; IMF, 2007)). In this trade, the newly industrialized economies comprising 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as ASEAN-5 imported parts 
and components from US and Japan and processed them into intermediate 
inputs. These inputs are then exported to China for final assembly as this last 
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stage of processing is the most labour intensive. Finally, China exports these 
final products back to US and Japan. 
 
Does China Divert Away Foreign Direct Investment? 
Another Southeast Asian concern is the diversion of FDI away from the region in 
the face of massive FDI flows into China. Such diversion became evident when 
Southeast Asia was still licking its wounds after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
In fact, the region’s share of total FDI declined from over 30% in mid-1990s to 
10% in 2000. With the global IT recession in 2001 and the outbreak of SARs 
(Severe acute respiratory syndrome) in 2003, FDI inflows of Southeast Asia still 
hovered around US$20 billion on average between 2000 and 2003 while that of 
China was more than double the inflows of Southeast Asia, recording almost 
US$50 billion on average (see Table 5). In 2006, FDI flow to China recorded 
US$69.5 billion and that of Southeast Asia recovered strongly to reach US$51.5 
billion. This trend shows that the issue of FDI diversion to China is uncalled for. 
In fact, FDI flows between the two entities grew concurrently with a rapid pace, 
indicating that FDI flows is not a zero sum game. The so-called diversion was 
mainly due to the uncertainties arising from the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis (Wu, et al, 2002), the global IT recession and the outbreak of SARs. 
According to Mercereau (2005) there is very little evidence to indicate that 
China’s success in attracting FDI has been at the expense of other countries in 
the region, with the exception of Singapore and Myanmar. Singapore suffered a 
decline in FDI was due to the global IT recession in 2001 and the outbreak of 
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SARs in 2003. Myanmar suffered a decline in FDI because Singapore, one of its 
main investing countries, has switched its investment focus to China. Kit, Ong 
and Kwang (December 2005) believed that East Asian economies of Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand will continue to draw FDI 
flows, notwithstanding China’s magnet for FDI. Their conclusion is based on the 
notion that  MNCs need to diversify their risks in investment among East Asian 
countries, and also that the lack of intellectual property protection in China may 
deter some MNCs from investing in China. 
 
Secondly, the need for division of labour in the Asian production networks arising 
from intra-industrial specialization among affiliates of MNCs and supply chain 
complementarities would lead to concurrent investment in both China and 
Southeast Asian region (Giroud, 2004; Ravenhill, 2006). Chantasasawat, Fung, 
Izaka, and Siu (2004) estimate that for a 10% increase in the China FDI, East 
and Southeast Asian countries are able to attract 5% to 6% in FDI. The 
correlation partly explains the complementary aspect of FDI between China and 
other parts of East Asia. This is especially so when China is already deeply 
involved in vertical specialization in electronics and telecommunication industry. 
According to Dean, Fung and Wang (January 2007), 35 per cent of the value of 
China’s exports to the world is attributed to imported inputs. In some sectors the 
percentage share is more than 50%. 
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China’s Emergence and Policy Implications 
The above discussion is at the aggregate level. Much insight will be shown if one 
goes deeper at industry or product level. Economic Analytical Unit (2003) uses 
Michaely index 4  to show China and East Asian countries’ major areas of 
comparative advantage and disadvantage. From the analysis (Table 6), China’s 
major comparative advantage is still in the areas of labour intensive 
manufactures. Its major comparative disadvantage is still confined to primary 
commodities such as crude oil and mineral products. However, China is rapidly 
moving up the value added chain, as shown in Table 7. China is gaining its 
comparative advantage in electronics and telecommunications products while 
loosing its advantage in light manufacturing products such as clothing and 
footwear as well as prepared foodstuff.  
 
Resource-based Industry and Policy Responses  
For the Southeast Asian region as a whole, the region has comparative 
advantage in resource-based products, such as timber (Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Myanmar); crude oil (Indonesia and Malaysia); palm oil (Indonesia and Malaysia); 
and other food products (Thailand and Vietnam). In this respect, exports of these 
commodities to China are that of complementary relationships. With an average 
GDP growth rate of about 9-10% a year since 1978, China has an insatiable 
appetite for raw materials to the extent that it has been labeled as a “hungry 
dragon” (Economist, 2nd October 2004). Its demand for primary commodities, 
especially energy, metal and food products has increased rapidly. China is now 
 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2008-26 10 
the second largest consumer of oil after the United States. In this case, 
Southeast Asia’s exports of commodities and foodstuff to China are considered 
as complementary in nature. However, some Southeast Asian countries are 
concerned that the higher demand for such products by China and the 
concurrent decline in manufacturing exports may lead eventually to their ‘de-
industrialization.’5 The term has a negative connotation of ‘exploitation’ and ‘old 
colonial division of labour’ (Bello, December 2006) of primary commodity 
producing countries6. The concern was especially widespread among Asian late-
comers such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia, and to a lesser extent, 
Thailand and the Philippines (Bello, December 2006; Cao, 2006; Tran, March 
2006). 
 
The complementary economic relationship between China and Southeast Asia 
would inevitably benefit Southeast Asia as a whole. This will contribute to the 
region’s GDP and thereby economic development of the region. As noted by 
Humphrey and Schmitz (April 2006), China has a substantial economic impact on 
Asia through its increasing demand for oil. Energy consumption has been driven 
by China’s rapid economic growth, accompanying by its industrialization, 
urbanization, and increased motorization. This has raised oil prices, contributing 
huge amount of oil revenue to the coffers of oil-exporting countries such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. However, oil-importing countries especially the 
late-comers will suffer greatly as oil import bills will rise substantially. In addition, 
rising oil prices will raise inflationary expectations among countries which can be 
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intractable macroeconomic problems for all nations. The increasing exports of 
other raw materials and foodstuff to China also help Southeast Asian 
development. As to the issue of de-industrialization, it is up to each of the 
Southeast Asian countries to undertake policy measures to avoid such process. 
Export proceeds earned from resource-based industries could be diverted to the 
effort of restructuring and upgrading their economies. The issues of ‘exploitation’ 
and ‘old colonial division of labour’7 would not be repeated as Southeast Asian 
countries also export manufactures and not just primary commodities in a 
globalized world. The policy issue here is how to exploit one country’s 
comparative advantage and at the same time to restructure the economy so as to 
be more competitive in the global market. 
 
Labour-intensive Manufacturing and Policy Implications 
A study by the Asian Development Bank (2007) concludes that “Southeast Asia 
competes in world markets with the PRC in labor-intensive manufacturing but the 
PRC is largely complementary in natural-based products and human capital- and 
technology-intensive manufactures.” According to IMF (October 2007: 47), “While 
there remains a clear division of labour among Asian sub-regions, the 
complementary relationship shows some signs of evolving into a more 
competitive one.” In particular, ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam) is experiencing rising competition from China. As 
Rahardja (August 2007) noted, these countries now feel competitive pressure 
from China in the third markets as well as in their own backyards. For instance, 
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China’s exports of machinery to the world in 1993 were at the same level as that 
of Malaysia. However, by 2004, China’s exports of the products were four times 
more than that of Malaysia. Tham (December 2001) concludes that for high-
technology products, Malaysia still has comparative advantage vis-à-vis that of 
China. Its resource-based products such as wood and wood products, crude oil 
and palm oil are making significant inroad into the Chinese market. However, 
Malaysia lost out in terms of export share of labour intensive products such as 
clothing and apparel. As for home markets, manufacturers of motorcycles in 
Indonesia (Rahardja, August 2007), Thailand and Vietnam (Intarakumnerd and 
Fujita, 2006) are under severe competition from imported Chinese motorcycles. 
However, ASEAN increased its market share (value term) in the US apparel 
market from 17.3% in 2005 to 19.3% in 2006 (ADB, 2007: 95). In particular, 
Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos have gained significant market share in the US 
clothing market. 
 
From the above analysis, it is difficult to ascertain whether China poses a threat 
to the Southeast Asian countries. In the exports of machinery and electronics 
products, there seems to be more of complementary nature. The only concern is 
that as China upgrades along its technological ladder, other Southeast Asian 
countries will also need to upgrade themselves to sustain its complementary 
relationship in the Asian production networks. In fact, the main threat comes from 
the southern provinces of China which are equally, if not more competitive than 
many Southeast Asian countries. In the face of increased competition not only 
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between China and the region but also among Southeast Asian countries 
themselves, each country will have to play a role in the “catching up” process 
through technology transfers from more advanced economies to less advanced 
to latecomers (IMF, 2007). This is the familiar “flying-geese model” as expounded 
by Akamatsu (1962). However, one main concern is that unlike NIEs, where they 
possess relatively strong indigenous technological base, Southeast Asian 
countries including Singapore still rely very much on MNCs for technology 
transfers. Unless MNCs are prepared to help upgrade host country’s 
technological levels, the question of technological upgrading especially among 
latecomers will become very remote. At the same time, host countries must also 
facilitate such technology transfers by raising educational standards, widespread 
use of English and enhance their research capabilities. 
 
As other labour intensive and light manufacturing in the third markets and home 
markets, competition from China is expected to be more severe. Singapore 
which is constantly facing labour shortage has reallocated such industries to 
other parts of Southeast Asia in the 1980s. Malaysia also shifts away from 
labour-intensive industries as it started to be under labour shortage pressure in 
the mid-1990s. With the rise of China, labour-intensive industries in Southeast 
Asian countries with the exception of Singapore and Malaysia are now facing 
increasingly competitive pressure from China. One way is to avert direct 
competition from China by focusing on those labour-intensive industries which 
are also resource-based such as oleo chemical products, rubber products and 
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processed foodstuff. As for footwear, apparels and clothing, Southeast Asian 
countries need to establish a niche market with solid branding. Such a strategy 
will be able to establish a strong foothold in the third markets. The other 
alternative is to exploit markets that China is still not able to penetrate much. For 
instance, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia can establish hubs for halal food for 
Middle East countries and even China market itself. 
 
Policy Implications for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
Kit, Ong and Kwan, (December 2005) argue that East Asia-7 (Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) will continue to 
draw FDI, despite that the fact that China has attracted a substantial amount of 
FDI inflows since 2003. Firstly, MNCs would like to diversify their risks as China 
while politically stable, may encounter various problems such as power outages, 
pollution and supply bottlenecks. The so-called “China plus one” strategy8 is to 
ensure that supply chain in the Asian production network would not be disrupted 
at any point of time. Secondly, manufacturers in EA-7 have moved up the value 
chain and already establish a niche in high-end products which are complement 
to the manufacturing and assembly of lower-end products. Thirdly, investment in 
China does not necessary mean profitable ventures. China is still at a very early 
stage of developing private property rights, general respects for intellectual 
property and high hygienic standards. Wages and office rentals in coastal 
provinces and cities are also increasing at a rapid rate that may also wide out 
their profit margins. However, Cross and Tan (2004) conclude that the greatest 
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competitive pressure will come from China for higher value-added market-
oriented FDI from Triad countries9. 
 
The policy implications from the above analysis are three folds. One is that if 
Southeast Asian countries were to stay relevant in the Asian production networks, 
the region has to be always stay ahead of China in a “flying-geese” pattern (ADB, 
2007:96). If China were to move up the value chain, Southeast Asia has to move 
up as well and must be always way ahead of China. Then their complementary 
relationships would be sustainable. In this manner, FDI flows to China will be 
accompanied by FDI flows to the region. Should any Southeast Asian country 
fails to keep up the pace, it would eventually fall behind China. Such competitive 
pressure from China is considered as ‘healthy’ in a globalized world as this will 
sustain increasing total productivity gains in the region. 
 
Secondly, for MNCs to consider as the next best alternative after China for risk 
diversification purpose, investment climate in the region has to be improved 
further “through increased legal certainty and strengthened governance to 
enforce contracts, to protect intellectual property, and to ensure that product 
standards are met.”10 Specifically, there is a need to introduce custom reforms 
and improve infrastructure and logistics services to reduce trade cost. In addition, 
ownership restrictions which are averse to MNCs should be reduced to a bare 
minimum. For instance, the “New Economic Policy” as implemented by Malaysia 
will do more harm than necessary in attracting FDI, not only because of its 
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ownership restrictions but also of its adverse effect on productivity growth (Ng, 
1998). Apart from micro level policies, macroeconomic stability and potential for 
growth are also important attractions for FDI flows. 
 
The third strategic step is to avert direct competition with China by exploiting its 
comparative disadvantage. These disadvantages include relatively low protection 
of intellectual property right, private property right and general disregard for high 
hygienic standard and environment protection. In this respect, investment policy 
should be directed at providing a conducive environment for those industries that 
require stringent rules and regulations on intellectual property rights and hygienic 
standards, and their enforcement of these rules. The other areas of great 
potentials are those based on technological innovations as well as innovative 
ideas. Singapore, for instance, has adopted this strategy by attracting FDIs which 
require patent right and intellectual property right protection such as 
pharmaceutical and multi-media industries.  
 
Huge Chinese Market as Investment Opportunities 
Investment in China to exploit its huge market requires certain core 
competencies, especially those based on indigenous technology in addition to 
investible fund. Among Southeast Asian countries, only Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand did make a stride in investing in China. One main barrier is that local 
enterprises in the region are not well-capitalized MNCs which should have 
established their own niche areas or branded products. To overcome this barrier 
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is to follow the Singapore model by developing its own government-linked 
corporations (GLCs) into MNCs. The other alternative is to develop its own local 
enterprises into MNCs as Japan and Korea have undertaken in the past decades. 
Moreover, the government can also encourage local enterprises to join MNCs in 
investing in China. To get involved in this type of joint-ventures in China, local 
enterprises must have certain niche either in terms of indigenous technology or in 
terms of local expertise in certain areas. Finally, GLCs can also take the lead in a 
business group comprising local private enterprises in investing in China, as 
Taiwan has pursued such a model for the last two decades. 
 
Services sector in China represents an enormous potential market for foreign 
investment. As China is taking step to liberalize its services sector, Southeast 
Asian investors should take advantage of its services liberalization. China’s 
services sector grew strongly in the 1990s as per capita income rises. However, 
the development of the services sector in China has been constrained by the 
country’s focus on manufacturing exports. At the same time, barriers were 
imposed on trade and investment in the services sector. Moreover, the services 
sector is dominated by many state monopolies such as the banking, insurance, 
telecommunication, and transport sector. With the accession to WTO in 2001, 
China has decided to speed up the development of its services sector. Steps 
have been taken to increase foreign participation to promote competition and 
improve efficiency. For instance, the Chinese government announced on in 
November 2007 that plans to encourage foreign investors to expand into 
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outsourcing services in China have been put in place. Ten cities including Beijing 
and Shanghai have also been assigned to house centres for outsourcing 
services. In this regards, China will gradually scrap restrictions on the destination, 
ownership and business scope of foreign investment in the services sector. With 
rapid urbanization and industrial development, services sector in China is 
expected to expand by leaps and bounds.  
 
Outbound tourism in China is another potential area for opportunities exploitation 
to investors in Southeast Asia. Outbound tourism of China officially started in 
1990 and it has gone from the phase of travel to Hong Kong and Macao, travel to 
the border regions to the phase of travel to other distant foreign countries (World 
Tourism Organization, 2006). Subsequently, outbound travel by private Chinese 
citizens has been increasing rapidly. From 1994 to 2000, the number of outbound 
travelers has experienced an increase of one million a year to reach 10 million in 
2000. After 2000, the rate of increase was about 3-4 million a year. By 2005, 
outbound numbers reached more than 31 million, as compared with 3.74 million 
in 1993. It is estimated that there are more than 200 million Chinese who are 
financially able to travel overseas. According to a forecast from the World 
Tourism Organization (2006), China will have 100 million outbound travelers and 
become the fourth largest source of outbound travel in the world by 2020. To 
support outbound tourism, nearly 700 licensed outbound travel agencies have 
been set up in China.  In addition, more than 90 countries have been given ADS 
(Approved Destination Status), and this figure is expected to increase further. In 
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this context, China represents the single greatest growth opportunity in the world 
for Southeast Asian travel destinations and tourism companies, as 91% of 
outbound Chinese tourists traveled in the Asia-Pacific region in 2006. Of these, 
about 3 million arrived ASEAN countries in 2005. Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
and Malaysia received larger portion of the pie11 (See Table 8). Together with the 
emergence of low cost airlines, inbound tourism presents vast potential 
opportunities to Southeast Asian countries. In response to this great potential, 
Singapore in April 2005 announced its plan to set up two integrated resorts (IR) 
as a major step towards this direction. According to its Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, the objective of the integrated resorts is “to broaden our leisure and 
entertainment options to enhance Singapore's reputation as a premium "must-
visit" destination for leisure and business visitors”12 Singapore has to act fast as 
many countries in the region are moving quickly to develop their tourist 
attractions to entice, among others, the large number Chinese outbound tourists. 
In addition, Singapore is also trying to attract health care tourism, not only from 
the ASEAN region but also from China. 
 
Strategic Partners in Outward Investment from China 
In 2001, the then Chinese premier, Mr. Zhu Rongji announced the adoption of 
‘Going Global’, i.e. encouraging Chinese companies to invest abroad. In March 
2006, the Chinese government reiterated its commitment to invest abroad. The 
agenda behind this drive is for energy security, geopolitical positioning and 
promotion of national competitiveness (Lunding, 2006). China’s outward 
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investment grew at an average of 65.6% per annum from 2000 to 2005. In 2006, 
outward investment during 2006 amounted to US$16.1 billion, as compared with 
US$2.9 billion in 2003. As at end of 2006, total stock of outward investment from 
China totaled US$73 billion, as against US$15.8 billion in 1995. The Chinese 
government estimates that by year 2010, the total stock of outward investment 
will go up to US$120 billion. There are more than 30,000 Chinese companies 
investing in 160 countries. However, there is a changing focus on these outward 
investments away from developed countries in North America and Europe 
towards Asia. About 60% of these Chinese overseas direct equity investments 
went to Asia. However, Southeast Asia received only an insignificant amount of 
these outward investments (Chia and Sussangkarn, 2006:118). The main 
recipients were Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Cambodia. China's outward 
investment is a "win-win" strategy for both China and Southeast Asia. Such 
capital flows not only create jobs at the investment destinations and boost the 
local economy, but also help Chinese firms to diversify export origins of their 
products and thus avoid any controversial trade disputes and conflicts with its 
trading partners, especially US and Europe. The main issue is how to attract 
these Chinese investments to the region, considering the fact that China is 
expected to amass a total of US$1.4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves in 2007. 
Alternatively, Southeast Asian countries should also seriously consider to treat 
China as a strategic partner in investment and trade in Europe, US, India and the 
Middle East by exploiting their traditional colonial links, as well as cultural and 
ethnic affinity to these regions. For instance, their Muslim, Chinese and Indian 
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communities can be empowered to be valuable resources for such strategic 
alliance in the venture. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
From the above analysis, one can safely conclude that China’s emergence as an 
economic powerhouse has benefited most of the Southeast Asian countries. In 
the Asian production networks, the complementary aspect of the production has 
given rise to a booming intra-regional and intra-industry trade. The triangular 
trade among the US, Japan, NIEs and Southeast Asian countries has resulted a 
certain degree of payment imbalances in favour of both China and the Asian 
region. However, there are concerns that as China moves up its technological 
ladder, some of the Southeast Asian countries fail to catch up in the process, to 
the extent that such complementary relationships may break down in the future. 
China’s emergence also benefits Southeast Asian countries in another way. With 
its rapid growth in the past three decades, China’s increasing demand for raw 
materials benefits a number of Southeast Asian countries, although some of 
them raise their concern of de-industrialization and a repeat of old colonial 
division of labour. Moreover, the labour-intensive industries in Southeast Asia 
may face the crowding-out effect from China.   
 
However, the huge domestic market of China presents great potentials for 
investment opportunities to the Southeast Asian countries. This is particularly so 
in the services sector, including outbound tourism from China. Equally important 
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is the outward investment by China which can supplement domestic capital for 
economic development and employment creation. The main beneficiaries are 
Southeast Asian latecomers such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.   
 
The paper also explores various policy implications arising from China’s 
economic emergence. Depending on their respective degrees of economic 
development, economic structure and comparative advantage, eight strategic 
positionings have been identified. Of these eight positionings, direct competition 
is considered as an unwise move, considering China being richly endowed with 
relatively cheap labour resources and possesses a huge domestic market which 
can serve as a magnet for direct foreign investment. Instead, competition based 
on niche areas through indigenous technology and branding, for instance, 
provide a viable alternative. The other alternative is to upgrade and restructure its 
economy, venturing into those areas where China has no comparative advantage. 
Others may adopt ‘connecting’ strategies such as complementing or 
supplementing the Chinese economy by meeting China’s increasing demand for 
natural resources or exploiting its huge domestic market. Still others may explore 
the possibilities of forging strategic alliance in the global market or playing the 
role of a middleman between China and the West.  
 
On the whole, Southeast Asian countries need constantly upgrade and 
restructure their respective economies as an effective policy response towards 
threats from China. They must be able to turn these threats into opportunities. 
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For instance, stiff competition from China’s labour-intensive industries should 
alert the local counterparts in Southeast Asia not to be complacent and increase 
their productivity constantly. Such competition from China will also allow the 
region to look beyond exporting traditional products by establishing a niche in 
matured markets. They must also look beyond the usual traditional markets by 
exploring those of unexploited ones in the Middle East and Latin America.  
 
Of no less importance is the need to Southeast Asian countries’ domestic 
business and investment climate. This is crucial in three respects. One is to be 
more competitive than China in attracting FDI from the Triad countries, as well as 
from NIEs and other intra-regional FDIs. Secondly, Southeast Asian countries 
should also serve as the next best, if not the better alternative to China for MNCs 
to diversify their overall risk in Asian investment. Finally, the better business and 
investment climate should serve as key attractions to China’ outward investment. 
 
Southeast Asian countries have been adopting export-oriented strategy as the 
main thrust for economic growth since 1970s. In the face of economic threat from 
China, a two-track strategy suggested by ‘Thaksinomics.’13 seems to be a more 
balanced approach as a policy response to the rise of China. The strategy 
requires a country to continue with the export-oriented approach and at the same 
time, to look inward to its domestic market as a renewed source for sustaining 
their economic growth. This strategy is only relevant to those countries which 
have large population base in the agricultural sector. Countries like Indonesia, 
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Thailand and Vietnam are possible candidates for such policy strategy. With this 
strategy, increase in government expenditure with a view to eradicate poverty 
and improve rural income will be the most effective way to ensure that the 
strategy is successful. However, the budgetary implications arising from such 
strategy could be enormous and the governance to avoid corrupt practices can 
be a challenging task to most of the Southeast Asian countries. 
 
Table 1: Correlation Coefficients of Mainland China and Regional Export Structure 
(3 digit SITC) 
 
 Mainland China 1990 Mainland China 2000 
Korea 1990 
Korea 2000 
Taiwan 1990 
Taiwan 2000 
Singapore 1990 
Singapore 2000 
Malaysia 1990 
Malaysia 2000 
Thailand 1990 
Thailand 2000 
Indonesia 1990 
Indonesia 2000 
Philippines 1990 
Philippines 2000 
0.38 
 
0.34 
 
0.10 
 
0.28 
 
0.30 
 
0.38 
 
0.23 
0.64 
0.43 
0.83 
0.53 
0.42 
0.41 
0.24 
0.44 
0.52 
0.51 
0.07 
0.33 
0.38 
0.33 
Source: Lall and Albaladejo (2004) table 4. 
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Table 2: Technological Structure of Manufactured Exports 2000 (%) 
 
 China Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines 
Resource- 
Based 
Low  
Technology 
Medium 
Technology 
High  
Technology 
14.3 
 
51.9 
 
26.9 
 
6.9 
9.5 
 
44.9 
 
21.2 
 
24.4 
27.8 
 
9.6 
 
23.4 
 
39.1 
14.9 
 
6.5 
 
17.4 
 
61.2 
31.9 
 
14.8 
 
18.0 
 
35.3 
13.1 
 
9.6 
 
17.8 
 
59.4 
24.2 
 
40.1 
 
15.1 
 
20.6 
18.4 
 
21.5 
 
23.8 
 
36.3 
54.2 
 
32.6 
 
11.3 
 
1.9 
33.7 
 
31.3 
 
17.5 
 
17.4 
37.6 
 
33.7 
 
12.9 
 
15.8 
6.5 
 
11.9 
 
11.6 
 
70.0 
Source: Lall and Albaladejo (2004) table 3.  
 
 
Table 3: China’s Threat to NIE in the World Market 2000 (% of Total Exports) 
 
Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines Category 
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
Partial 
Threat 
 
No threat 
 
Direct 
threat 
 
Reverse 
threat 
 
Mutual 
withdrawal 
33.6 
 
 
12.8 
 
49.0 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
2.3 
40.4 
 
 
32.0 
 
23.5 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
0.7 
47.7 
 
 
12.6 
 
10.8 
 
 
22.4 
 
 
6.5 
56.5 
 
 
5.0 
 
28.7 
 
 
6.3 
 
 
3.5 
41.8 
 
 
7.5 
 
40.1 
 
 
6.5 
 
 
4.1 
61.6 
 
 
15.9 
 
15.1 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
1.3 
22.8 
 
 
5.7 
 
37.1 
 
 
5.6 
 
 
28.9 
48.3 
 
 
10.7 
 
19.9 
 
 
8.9 
 
 
12.2 
30.7 
 
 
7.2 
 
34.4 
 
 
6.6 
 
 
21.1 
44.0 
 
 
44.3 
 
5.8 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
2.4 
Source: Lall and Albaladejo (2004)
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Table 4: Share of Manufactures in China’s Imports from ASEAN (%) 
 
 
 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Indonesia 54.4 29.2 22.5 23.5 34.1 29.0 25.3 27.0 25.0 22.4 22.3 
Malaysia 11.9 41.0 48.3 40.9 41.9 49.4 54.5 62.1 54.5 50.8 50.2 
Philippines 1.8 6.5 18.6 24.1 45.6 58.4 59.9 69.2 79.3 81.0 92.5 
Singapore 28.6 48.5 48.2 50.9 60.5 68.1 66.5 67.1 66.0 66.6 68.4 
Thailand 10.4 14.5 21.5 31.7 47.7 45.2 44.5 45.9 53.3 46.7 59.7 
ASEAN-5 
(weighted 
average) 
31.1 34.9 36.5 39.1 49.2 52.2 51.7 56.0 56.1 54.1 55.5 
Source: Revenhill (2006),Table 2. Calculated from U.N. COMTRADE data  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Country (US$ million) 
 
 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
China 57 3487 40715 46878 52743 53505 60630 72406 69468
Southeast Asia 2756 12821 23541 19582 15774 19920 35245 41071 51483
Brunei -20 7 549 526 1035 3375 334 289 434
Cambodia 1 … 149 149 145 84 131 381 483
Indonesia 300 1092 -4550 -2978 145 -597 1896 8337 5556
Lao … 6 34 24 25 19 17 28 187
Malaysia 934 2611 3788 554 3203 2473 4624 3965 6060
Myanmar 0 225 208 192 191 291 251 236 143
Philippines 114 550 2240 195 1542 491 688 1854 2345
Singapore 1236 5575 16484 15649 7338 10376 19828 15004 24207
Thailand 189 2575 3350 3886 947 1952 5862 8957 9751
Timor-Leste 0 0 0 84 1 5 3 … 3
Vietnam 2 180 1289 1300 1200 1450 1610 2021 2315
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment 
Report 2007 
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Table 6: China’s Major Areas of Comparative Advantage and Disadvantage 
 
 
Top 10 Comparative Advantage Groupings Top 10 Comparative Disadvantage 
Groupings 
Clothing 
Office machines and parts 
Footwear 
Toys and sporting goods 
Furniture 
Leather articles 
Plastic articles 
Iron and steel articles 
Prepared foodstuffs 
Video and digital cameras 
Mobile phones 
Non-office machines 
Electronic integrated circuits and micro 
assemblies 
Plastic in primary forms 
Crude oil 
Chemical products 
Steel 
Instruments (not timekeeping or musical) 
Copper and copper articles 
Mineral ores 
Aircraft 
Source: Economic Analytical Unit (2003) Table 2.1. 
 
 
Table 7: China’s Changing Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
Top 5 Areas of Strengthening Advantage  Top 5 Areas of Improving Disadvantage 
Office machines and parts 
Video and digital cameras; mobile phones 
Iron and steel articles 
Video recorders 
Furniture 
Non-office machines 
Non-rail vehicles 
Steel 
Fertilizers 
Synthetic fibres and fabrics 
 
Top 5 Areas of Declining Advantage Top 5 Areas of Worsening Disadvantage 
Clothing 
Vegetables products 
Animals and animal products 
Footwear 
Prepared foodstuffs 
 
Electronic integrated circuits and micro-
assemblies 
Crude oil 
Organic chemicals 
Oilseeds 
Diodes, transistors and semiconductors 
 
Source: Economic Analytical Unit (2003) Table 2.2. 
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Table 8: Visitor Arrivals from China to ASEAN Countries 
 
1995 2005 1995-2005  
Country No. 000 Share of 
China (%) 
 Share of 
China (%) 
 Share of 
China (%) 
Brunei 0 0.00 4 0.1 38 0.6
Indonesia 39 0.90 53 1.8 264 0.5
Malaysia 103 1.38 352 11.7 3437 3.0
Philippines 9 0.51 107 3.6 327 1.5
Singapore 202 2.83 858 25.5 5238 6.5
Thailand  376 5.49 762 25.3 6948 6.8
Cambodia 23 10.45 50 2.0 341 5.5
Laos 4 1.16 39 1.3 259 3.6
Myanmar 0 0.00 20 0.7 131 3.8
Vietnam  63 4.66 753 25.0 5999 25.1
ASEAN 818 2.76 3007 5.9 22984 5.5
Source: ASEAN Secretariat. Available at URL: http://www.aseansec.org 
 
 
                                                 
1 There were factions in China then. One led by reformist, Deng Xiao Peng and the other by Chen Yun, a 
conservative. The two factions fought over the extent and the pace over economic reforms for China. It is 
the ultimate victory for Deng that he decided to accelerate the pace of economic reform in 1992 (Yang, 
2004). 
2 There are three major regional production networks in the world. One is based in Northern America with 
its base in Silicon Valley. The others are the Asian production networks and the European production 
networks. 
3  For detailed discussion on China’s economic rise as threats and opportunities, please refer to Ng 
(December 2007.) 
4 The index measures a product’s share of exports minus its share of imports. If the index is positive, it 
indicates that the country is a net exporter. Otherwise it is a net importer. The index is therefore a revealed 
comparative advantage (disadvantage) of  a country. 
5 It is also known as ‘Dutch disease’ arising from re-allocation of resources from traditional industrial 
sector to the booming sector such that output share from the traditional industrial sector falls as a 
consequence. 
6 This same view was also expressed by a New York Times article (29 June 2002) that “China is grabbing 
much of the new foreign investment in Asia, leaving its once-glittering neighbors – Thailand, South Korea, 
Singapore – with crumbs… Some Asian officials say they fear that Southeast Asia will be relegated to the 
role of supplier of food and raw materials to China in exchange for cheap manufactured goods…” 
7 In this division of labour, developed countries which were also the colonial masters, imported primary 
commodities from their colonies at lower prices. They then processed these primary commodities into 
manufactured goods and exported back to their colonies at much higher prices.  
8 This is an MNC strategy in diversifying their risk in investment in China and other Asian region. If a plant 
is built in China, another plant will also be set up in other parts of Asia.  
9 Triad countries refer to the United States, Japan and Europe. 
10 Asian Development Bank Outlook, 2007b, p. 74. 
11 The growth of the Asia Pacific tourism market is further fuelled by the growing middle class in India, the 
Middle East and ASEAN region. 
12 Ministry of Trade and Industry, http://app.mti.gov.sg/default.asp?id=585. 
13 According to Thaksinomics (proposed by the former Thai prime minister, Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra), it is 
an eclectic strategy comprising two tracks. The first tract is the usual export-oriented strategy in 
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manufacturing spearheaded by multinational corporations (MNCs). The second track provides strong 
support to local enterprises leveraging on indigenous skills and resources. In the short run, the government 
strategy is to stimulate domestic demand through its expenditure on rural and agricultural sector. In the 
meantime, the second track also seeks to develop new local industries as part of the diversification away 
from export-oriented activities. In addition, the track also attempt to implement measures to assist business 
to move up the value added chain, thus keeping ahead of direct Chinese competition 
(http://www.thaksinomics.com/). 
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